The Taliban Biography

The Structure and Leadership of the Taliban 1996-2002

Documents Show U.S. Officials Worried Mullah Omar Was Growing Closer to Bin Laden in 1998

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 295

Washington, D.C., November 13, 2009 - Three years before al Qaeda's attacks on the United States on 9/11, U.S. officials detected an alarming shift in the ideological stance of Taliban leader Mullah Omar toward pan-Islamism – a change that portended a burgeoning alliance between the Afghan regime and Osama bin Laden. The report that Omar might be falling under bin Laden's "influence" is contained in a December 1998 U.S. Embassy cable from Islamabad, Pakistan, one of a number of recently declassified government documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by the National Security Archive and published here today on the eighth anniversary of the Taliban's expulsion from Kabul.

The new documents provide other revealing insights into the inner workings of the notoriously opaque Taliban which underscore the challenges and potential opportunities that continue to confront U.S. policy-makers today. For example, while the organization in the late 1990s showed a troubling inclination toward radical Islamic thinking on issues beyond its usually more parochial concerns, it also displayed a pragmatic and even opportunistic side, recruiting troops from a variety of political perspectives including local communists. And although the documents describe Mullah Omar as highly authoritarian and adept at keeping his political rivals off-balance, the organization had evidenced a surprising diversity of viewpoints within its upper ranks, which suggested possible weak spots in the organization's control.

Essential background information on the regime has always been largely second-hand, contested or altogether absent from the public record. In order to facilitate better public understanding of the group and its principal figures, the National Security Archive has organized a unique and comprehensive chart, compiled entirely from U.S. government sources, detailing biographical and professional information on more than 40 important Taliban officials.

In addition to highly informative biographical materials, the declassified documents in this briefing book contain fascinating new details about Taliban structure, decision-making and evolving ideology. The December 1998 Embassy cable noted above describes how Mullah "Omar – perhaps under the influence of bin Ladin and other extremists – may have become more sympathetic to pan-Islamist thinking. For example, he was quoted at least twice in 1998 as criticizing the U.S. presence in the Gulf, which is not usually a great concern of Afghans."

Furthermore, Mullah Omar's Taliban ruling style may be even more controlling and brutal than previously reported. The December 1998 Embassy cable mentioned above notes that Omar "maintains an idiosyncratic, almost obscurantist, leadership style," making policy decisions, "but generally leav[ing] the day-to-day matters to his key lieutenants." In order to ensure his deputies remain "off balance" and do "not grow overly comfortable in their positions, Omar also rotates Taliban officials from post-to-post, apparently at a whim." Omar may have felt threatened by his now-deceased deputy, Mullah Mohammad Rabbani. A "moderate," who reportedly disagreed with Omar's decision to protect al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, Rabbani wanted to "settle the [bin Laden] matter before [the Taliban] become even more isolated from the international community." By 1996, Omar had purged Taliban members loyal to Mullah Rabbani in order to prevent his Deputy from gaining popularity and an independent base of power.

Also contained in the documents are indications that despite Mullah Omar's authoritarian methods, the Taliban may have been more politically and ideologically diverse than previously known. In March 1997, U.S. State Department officials note that "while we do not know much about [Taliban] decision-making, there is enough anecdotal evidence to suggest there are differences of opinion among high-level Taliban leaders. And when they do reach a decision, there is not a well-defined process for communicating that decision to all the areas under their control, let alone making sure that it is carried out." There is surprising ideologically heterogeneity in the organization as some Taliban officials, such as Minister of Defense Mullah Obaidullah, regularly recruit former communists for Taliban membership. U.S. officials note, "there are also many non-ideological Afghans (former commanders, tribal leaders, khalqis, etc.) who have jumped into the Taliban bandwagon for their own motives. There is thus some evidence to suggest that in provinces where they are in control, they – or at least their ideology – are spread thin."

As a collection, the documents reproduced here provide an interesting illustration of the complexity of dealing with a repugnant political regime. U.S. State Department officials describe Taliban social policies as abominable; yet they find themselves engaged in regular diplomatic contact and even supporting potential commercial deals. While the State Department is studying reports of growing domestic opposition to the Taliban (prompting Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to write in the margins of one memo, "This is encouraging"), UNOCAL (the Union Oil Company of California) is sponsoring a Taliban delegation on a tour of the United States in hopes of getting permission to build a pipeline through Afghanistan. One of the visitors, Mullah Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Taliban Minister of Education and Minister of Information and Culture, is described as a "key figure in the Taliban's ideological projects," and an individual even more "extreme on social issues than most Taliban." The State Department confesses U.S. policy "will inevitably be messy and the policy we follow will be ridden with inner tensions, as we simultaneously engage with the Taliban and criticize their abuses."

Highlights:

· A cable indicating that by 1998 U.S. diplomats are growing concerned that Taliban leader Mullah Omar may be becoming increasingly ideologically influenced by Osama Bin Laden.

· A cable reporting that Taliban Foreign Minister Jalil told U.S. officials in January 1997 that "bin Ladin had lived in caves south of Jalalabad in Tora Bora and the Taliban had become suspicious."

· A May 2000 handwritten note from Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on the Taliban.

· A 1997 Document on Jalaluddin Haqqani, a critical figure of the past 20 years of Afghan politics.

· Details on how the Taliban governed Afghanistan through the "Inner" Shura, the "Outer" Shura, the Caretaker Council and the "Ulema" Shura.

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